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The evolution of post-accession diasporas and diaspora policies after 2004: a comparative analysis of Poland and Lithuania

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ABSTRACT

Diaspora policy hinges upon multiple issues linked to the state of origin, state of destination, and international environment, as well as the size and nature of the diaspora itself. This article examines the evolution of Poland and Lithuania's diaspora policies in response to the transformation of the diasporas' nature from 'liquid' to 'solid' in the EU post-accession period. Drawing on existing data and statistics, and an analysis of the documents and actions taken by the Polish and Lithuanian governments, the article presents four layers of the transformation of diaspora policies: adjustment, inducement, partnership, and embracement.

KEYWORDS Post-accession diaspora; diaspora governance; diaspora policy layers; policy transformation; Poland; Lithuania

Introduction

This article analyses changes in the diaspora policies of Poland and Lithuania as a reaction to the evolution of post-accession diasporas. Following the accession to the EU in 2004 and the opening of the labor markets of some EU countries to citizens of new member states, Poland and Lithuania quickly experienced a massive outflow of citizens. This so-called post-accession emigration was a significant phenomenon, incomparable to previous waves because of its magnitude, dynamics, and new directions. The development of new diaspora settings was a challenge for the countries of origin, which had to react and adjust their policies to the evolution of the diaspora population from temporary and circular, to more permanent and settled.

Diaspora policy may be broadly defined as a set of activities and institutions implemented by the state of origin that directly and indirectly addresses diaspora members. The main goal of a diaspora policy is to create symbolic, identity, and practical ties between the diaspora and the state, thereby building a political community that crosses national borders. The dominant approach to analyzing diaspora policy

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focuses on the role of the state of origin and indicates that the political and economic model of the state (Ragazzi 2009) and its interests (Gamlen 2006) are the main factors shaping its aims and content. We aim to complement this approach and pay attention to the role of diaspora and how its changing nature is an important stimulus for the evolution of state policies.

There is substantial literature on researching and analyzing migration processes after successive EU enlargements (Drinkwater, Eade, and Garapich 2009; Nowak and Nowosielski 2018; Lafleur and Vintila 2020; Waterbury 2017), however, only a modest part of it has been devoted to the settlement process of those who emigrated after 2004, which we here call post-accession diasporas (Bygnes and Erdal 2017; Engbersen, Snel, and De Boom 2010; Ryan 2015; Ferguson, Salominaite, and Boersma 2016). Poland and Lithuania experienced not only significant outflows after the EU accession, but also very dynamic transformations of their diaspora policies in the last two decades. Considering the scarcity of texts on the diaspora policy development of new EU members from a comparative perspective, this article fills an important gap.

This article addresses two main hypotheses:

Hypothesis one (H1): There is a noticeable evolution of the diasporas of Poland and Lithuania after accession to the EU in 2004 from "liquid" to "solid."

Hypothesis two (H2): In reaction to these changes in post-accession diasporas, Polish and Lithuanian state policies were transformed from ad hoc/reactive to more deliberate/proactive.

The article applies two dimensions from the three-dimensional (narrative, structural, and practical) analytical model of diaspora policy (Lesińska and Popyk 2021), the major aim of which is to focus on the origin countries and diaspora interactions in a political context. The first element – narrative – focuses on analyzing official documents regarding the diaspora. The second applied dimension – practical – includes the analysis of strategies and practices undertaken by the state to establish cooperation with the diaspora.

The article consists of the following sections. The article opens with a discussion of the conceptual framework for how states of origin govern diasporas and the different perspectives and typologies in the literature related to diaspora policy. The next part presents profiles of the Polish and Lithuanian post-accession diasporas and describes the noticeable transformation from 'liquid' to 'solid' diasporas. The core section is devoted to an analysis of the development of diaspora policies in both countries.

We define four major layers of post-accession diaspora policy formation after 2004: adjustment, inducement, partnership, and embracement. Finally, we demonstrate that the evolution of diaspora policies correlates with changes in the nature of diasporas. The article ends with recommendations for further research.

Literature review

Diaspora transformation

Poland and Lithuania have long histories of emigration marked by successive waves of outflows since the mid-nineteenth century. As a result, large diasporas have spread all over the world, estimated at 20 million and 1.3 million, respectively, which are almost half of the populations of the original states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania 2022). The accession of both countries to the EU

in 2004 was the starting point of another large-scale outflow and a new form of transient mobility. In the following years, hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians and Poles used the free movement policy, which gives EU citizens legal residence status in any destination within the Union, to move to 'old' member countries to search for better educational, employment, and social opportunities (Ferguson, Salominaite, and Boersma 2016).

Post-accession emigration is characterized by a greater variety of destinations than previous migration waves. In the past, the main receiving countries for Poles and Lithuanians were mainly Germany, the US, and Canada. Since 2004, the UK and Ireland (which were the first to open their labor markets to citizens of the new member states) have become the main destinations, followed by Germany, Norway, and the Netherlands (Europos Migracijos Tinklas 2021; Central Statistical Office of Poland 2020). The population of the post-2004 emigrants is commonly called the 'new' diaspora (Fiń et al. 2013). It is characterized not only by its intensity and new destinations but also by the profile of emigrants, the majority of whom are young (most at the 'mobility age' of 15–44) and well-educated (Drinkwater, Eade, and Garapich 2009).

The scale of the outflow from Poland and Lithuania, noticeable since 2004, was unexpected and unforeseen by authorities and the public in both the countries of origin and destination states (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008). The data shows that population of Lithuania population decreased from 3.4 million (Europos Migracijos Tinklas 2021) to 2.8 million, with about 700,000 leaving their home country for permanent residence in other European countries (Europos Migracijos Tinklas 2021). Similarly, according to the Central Statistical Office of Poland (2020), in 2019 about 2.4 million Poles stayed abroad for longer than three months, the vast majority of whom (two million) resided in EU countries. In 2004, there were one million Poles abroad and, since EU accession, the number of Poles abroad has increased by 1.4 million.

In the literature, post-accession flows are often described as 'liquid migration' (Engbersen, Snel, and De Boom 2010) due to their erratic scale and directions. The main inspiration for this term was Bauman's (2012) development of the term 'liquidity.' Liquid migration has been characterized (Engbersen, Snel, and De Boom 2010) as individual, temporary, and circular labor migration, undertaken by those who move back and forth between the countries of origin and destination with no definite plans to permanently settle abroad. The changeability of post-accession migration has also been labeled as 'intentional unpredictability' (Drinkwater, Eade, and Garapich 2009) or 'deliberate indeterminacy' (Moriarty et al. 2010). Moreover, the liquidity/unpredictability of post-accession migration in the early years after 2004 was justified by the consistent findings of some empirical studies (Drinkwater, Eade, and Garapich 2009).

Over time, short-term and fluctuating migration started to change its character as temporary young migrants increasingly chose to embed in destination countries (Ryan 2015). Friberg (2012, 1603) portrayed this process by describing Polish migrant settlers in Norway as those who 'start out as target-earners, but many of them gradually change their adaptation and strategies and become open-ended or long-term transnational commuters or settle down permanently with their families.' At the personal level, the evolution from temporary to permanent settlement is linked to the common aspirations of migrants to gain more durability and security (Grzymała-Każłowska 2018; Sime 2018). The authors of several qualitative studies also showed that post-accession migrants seek stability in new life settings, which inspired the authors to develop concepts to

describe this process, such as ‘social anchoring’ (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2018), ‘embedding’ (Ryan 2015), or seeking out ‘grounded lives’ (Bygnes and Erdal 2017).

The process of the settlement and integration of migrants in a host country has also been the subject of some theoretical and empirical studies (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2018; Ryan 2015). Douglas Massey (1986), in his study on the settlement process of Mexicans in the USA, distinguished (based on classical text of Piore (1980)) four dimensions of integration that increase the likelihood of permanent settlement in the destination country: ‘institutional integration’ (establishment of connections with varied state and non-state institutions, such as offices, schools, social services, and associations), ‘economic integration’ (obtaining more stable and better-paying jobs), ‘spending patterns’ (less money remitted home and more spending in the country of living), and ‘interpersonal integration’ (the formation of friendship ties with members of the host society).

Massey’s approach still seems to be accurate, however, researchers examining the process of settlement of post-accession migrants have underlined additional factors. One of them is living abroad with other family members. Studies show that eagerness to settle prevails among migrants with school-age children (Moskal 2011). Additionally, having children overseas diminishes return migration plans (Sime 2018). Family life abroad also entails stronger institutional and interpersonal integration (Massey 1986), as migrant parents have to engage not only with the governmental institutions (for example, consulates and embassies), but also educational institutions (kindergartens, schools, and universities). Besides, as a result of joining governmental and non-governmental institutions, migrants interact with other diaspora and non-diaspora members and develop social ties and connections (Ferguson, Salominaite, and Boersma 2016). Another factor that indicates anchoring in the host society is the adoption of its norms, values, and practices, thereby enhancing social remitting (White and Grabowska 2019). Consequently, a significant amount of research indicates that post-accession migration from Poland and Lithuania was not only temporary labor migration, but partially became permanent emigration, and, as a result, formed a more solid type of post-accession diaspora.

Governing diasporas

Changes in both governmental policies toward populations abroad and the increasing constitution of these populations as ‘diasporas’ are best understood not only as expedient policies but as the result of broader structural shifts in the ‘art of government,’ in particular how relations between authorities, territories, and populations are rationalized, organized, practiced, and legitimized at the transnational and international levels. In brief, the proliferation of state-led diaspora policies must be understood as a process, as the result of the unequal, heterogeneous, and increasing spread of ‘neoliberal governmentality,’ and as modular reterritorialized rationality and a practice of power. The discourse of ‘diaspora’ has been an effective performative discourse in the legitimization of this shift (Ragazzi 2009, 383).

As stated by Francesco Ragazzi (2009), diasporic governmentality in modern societies can be seen as a structural response to the deterritorialization of the state. He also suggested an inversion in the definition of a state: due to deterritorialization, the process of governing takes place not within a given territory, but rather within a diasporic population that can be scattered globally. Thus, considering diaspora-state relations, diasporic governmentality can be viewed as a complex and evolving

process, which is often explained either by analyzing macro-structural settings, such as globalization, transport, and communications, or by emphasizing the state's narrow economic interests and strategies, for example, through lobbying and remittances (Ragazzi 2009).

On that account, Michel Foucault also argued attending to the ways government is practiced is not enough to understand how certain spheres of life are governed. It is equally important to ask how certain governmental practices are rationalized or mediated. Ragazzi (2009, 384–385) sketched five entry points for a possible Foucauldian methodology to address diaspora policies: episteme, knowledge, categorization, the position of the enunciator, and *techne*. The first point is epistemological and suggests that understanding diasporic policies requires analyzing 'the broader material (economic crisis, war) and intellectual (nationalism, liberalism) conditions in which a specific problem of government arises' (348). The second point relates to a set of possible techniques of knowledge that could make the phenomena of emigration visible and manageable. The third point relates to possible categories of practice, for example, diaspora, guest-worker, and political exile. The fourth point concerns the position of the enunciator and poses such questions as 'which social actors are in the material and symbolic struggle for the imposition of their visions, categorizations and functions within a specific category' (348). Finally, Ragazzi suggested that researchers ask by what techniques and technologies of government are the aforementioned categories of the population governed, or by which modalities do populations resist the categorizations or functions imposed on them (349).

Alan Gamlen (2006, 4) developed another approach for the analysis of diaspora policies. He argued against approaching diaspora engagement policies as part of a unitary, coordinated state strategy and instead suggested that such policies should be viewed less like 'policies' and more like a 'constellation of institutional and legislative arrangements and programs that come into being at different times, for different reasons, and operate across different timescales at different levels within home-states' (Gamlen 2006, 4). Hence, Gamlen (2006) proposed a typology for categorizing the perspectives of states engaged in diaspora governmentality according to the type of engagement: this includes tapping, embracing, and governing perspectives. It is important to emphasize that any state can use these types of diaspora engagement policies, as they depend neither on geographic nor economic type, nor on the model of citizenship (ethnic or civic) established in the state.

The tapping perspective on the rise of diaspora institutions is based on 'rationalism and neostructuralism' (Gamlen, Cummings, and Vaaler 2019, 496), which indicates that origin states perceive diaspora as a 'resources to pursue national interests' (496). This refers to the neoliberal form of governmentality (Ferguson 2010) that relies on mechanisms which are developed in the private sector and then transplanted to the state. As a result, as defined by James Ferguson (2010, 172), the state is run 'like a business.' The economic benefits of the diaspora are realized through various investment policies (for example, mandatory payments for expatriates, remittances and FDI capture, and knowledge transfer programs). Additionally, Ragazzi (2014, 87) observed that, regardless of the size of the diaspora population or the number of remittances sent to the home-state, financial deregulation and openness to international trade correlates with states pursuing diaspora policies, while political economies defined by high tariffs and highly regulated financial markets correlate with closed states, which led him to suggest that

the development of diaspora policies is best explained by analyzing the political-economical model of a state.

Gamlen et al. (2013, 7) also noted that, within the tapping perspective, origin states anticipate 'win-to-win' outcomes in which the state facilitates economic emigration and the emigrants acquire better employment. For neoliberalists, origin states also have 'incentives to tap diasporas, but less as foreign policy auxiliaries and more as agents of economic cooperation and development' (77–78). Thus, the tapping perspective is common among countries where economic emigration prevails.

The embracing perspective introduced by Gamlen et al. (2013, 8) is a constructivist-inspired approach to diaspora institutions. The main task of this perspective is "embracing" lost compatriots and imbuing nation-states with extra-territorial reach.' The authors mentioned that one characteristic of this perspective is that the origin state's activities aim to reinforce national identity beyond the borders, despite possible disagreement about the nature of the identity.

The governing perspective, however, differs from the first two, which reveal the 'internal, domestic-level interests and identities of the origin states' (Gamlen, Cummings, and Vaaler 2019, 449). In contrast, the governing perspective illustrates how states tend to merge their diaspora policies with those in the geographical area while promoting global diaspora governance. The adaption of policy models from other states is called convergence (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003) and is considered to be a phase of diaspora transformation.

All three of Gamlen's perspectives demonstrate that diaspora policy is a crucial *modus operandi* of the modern state that can help understand a state and the way it governs. As claimed by some authors, the state should be studied not as something real and tangible, but rather examined as an effect that creates a difference between what belongs to the apparatus of power and the object on which that power is exercised (Mitchell 1991). The process of policymaking is exactly the place where the state (effect) is (re)produced. The implementation of certain policies creates differences between the state and its subjects. Policies define and establish who belongs to a target group, who does not, and about whom the state is concerned. Policies, then, are about making categorizations and the policymaking process is exactly where the category of diaspora is put into practice. Categorizations, however, are hardly context-free. The meaning and the content of the category of the diaspora depends on the context and intentions of the practitioner, the state (Dufoix 2008), which can vary depending on the target groups and time frames, which is called divergence (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003).

The diaspora governmentality formation is a fluctuating process (Gamlen 2006) based on the involvement of diaspora members into 'a web of rights and obligations in the extended community defined with the home country as the center' (Bhagwati 2003, 101). The factors that shape diaspora policy can be driven by perspectives in the country of origin (political situation in the home country, social and political discourses on emigration and diaspora, and political parties' attitudes) or by the destination countries' orientations (immigration and integration policies for newcomers and settlers) (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2016). Additionally, the international context (political and economic relationships between the home and the host countries, international law) should also be considered (Weinar 2017). The characteristics and nature of the diasporas themselves impact the formation of diaspora policy, but they have been greatly overlooked in contemporary policy discourse.

We argue that diaspora policy is, to a great extent, shaped by multiple factors, such as diaspora size, migration intentions, growth of the birth rate abroad, naturalization rate, and decreased economic remittances sent back to the home countries, all of which indicate the evolution of post-accession diasporas (such as the Polish and Lithuanian cases) from 'liquid' to 'solid' in terms of grounded settling (Bygnes and Erdal 2016).

The evolution of the post-accession diasporas of Poland and Lithuania

A diaspora, like any other social entity, is far from a static population, on the contrary, it may 'grow, decline, and disintegrate as a result of phased dynamic processes' (Sheffer 2003, 141). We draw on Massey's (1986) four dimensions of integration and several concepts related to liquid and settled migration (Bygnes and Erdal 2016; Grzymała-Kazłowska 2018; Ryan 2015; White and Grabowska 2019), to prove hypothesis one (H1) to portray the changing nature of post-accession diasporas (understood as post-accession migrant communities in destination countries). For this purpose, we introduce two ideal ('ideal' is used here in Weberian terms, meaning that it is not a description of reality but a deliberately exaggerated abstraction, which is useful for analytical and comparative purposes) types of diasporas: 'liquid' and 'solid.'

A 'liquid diaspora' is characterized by a substantial proportion of temporary migrants with ambiguous plans about whether they will stay or return. Relatively few migrants in this type of diaspora make a clear decision whether to settle permanently in a host country. Thus, they maintain deep sentimental and material ties with their countries of origin by frequent home visits and hold regular transborder communication with those who stayed. Temporary migrants greatly rely on economic remittances sent back to their homelands. Hence, a liquid diaspora is an initial stage of forming a more established community. At this point, it is similar to the classical term 'insipient diaspora' proposed by Myron Weiner (1986) to describe the relatively sizable populations of foreign workers who arrived in industrial economies in the postwar period to fill gaps in the labor force but were not expected to settle permanently.

In contrast to the liquid diaspora, the 'solid diaspora' is characterized by mostly permanently settled migrants who are well-grounded in the country of residence. For the members of a solid diaspora, the host country, not the homeland, is perceived as the center of life. In a solid diaspora, migrants settle abroad with their families (reunited or made abroad), spend and invest earnings in the destination country, and often apply for citizenship there. The migrants have definite future residence plans, are likely to adopt the host country's values, norms, and practices in their private lives, integrate with the host society, and devote their income to settling in the residence country.

The evolution of Polish and Lithuanian post-accession emigrants from a liquid into a solid diaspora (H1) can be validated by data that confirms the settlement process, such as changes in family settlement (growth in the number of children born abroad and attending schools abroad), spending patterns (decreased economic remittances), and an increasing number of naturalizations in main destination countries.

After 2007, individual migration began to transform into family migration, which is illustrated by the growth in the number of births to post-accession migrants. One reliable example is Norway, which is a new destination for post-accession migrants.¹ Statistics from Norway demonstrate that the number of children born to emigrant parents from Poland and Lithuania greatly increased from 2010 to 2020. The number of children born to two Polish parents grew from 2,816 in 2010 to 14,263 in 2020.




Figure 1. Number of births to Polish parents compared to the number of Polish migrants in Norway in 2010–2020. Source: Authors’ calculation based on Statistics Norway (2021)




Figure 2. Number of births to Lithuanian parents compared to the number of Lithuanian migrants in Norway in 2010–2020. Source: Authors’ calculation based on Statistics Norway (2021)

Moreover, in 2020, about 6,300 children were born to one Polish parent. Similarly, the number of children born to Lithuanian emigrants in Norway rose from 503 in 2010 to 6,672 in 2020 (this excludes about 1,300 children born to one Lithuanian parent in 2020 (Statistics Norway 2020) (see Figures 1 and 2).




Figure 3. Number of births to mothers of Polish and Lithuanian nationalities in England and Wales in 2005–2019. Source: Authors' calculations based on Office for National Statistics of the UK (2019). Note: No data is available on Lithuania from 2005 to 2010.

Similar trends can be observed in England and Wales, where the growing number of Polish and Lithuanian long-term emigrants was followed by an increase of childbirth abroad (see [Figure 3](#)).

According to the Office for National Statistics of the UK (2019), the number of children born to Polish mothers grew from 3,403 in 2005 to 22,928 in 2015, and slightly decreased to 16,737 in 2019. In comparison, the number of children born to Lithuanian mothers in England and Wales rose from 3,788 in 2011 to 4,133 in 2019 (data from 2005 to 2010 is unavailable).

The growing number of Polish and Lithuanian migrants, and the increase in births abroad, required the establishment of more Polish and Lithuanian nurseries and schools abroad. Thus, in 2020, there were 50 Polish schools at consulates in EU countries (including the UK), many of which were established or transformed in 2007–2008. All schools report an increase in Polish pupils enrolled. In the 2019–2020 academic year, there were twice as many schoolchildren as in 2007–2008. Moreover, in 2020, there were 370 Polish community schools in EU countries (202 of which were located in the UK), three-quarters of which were founded between 2005 and 2011 (Center for the Development of Polish Education Abroad). Lithuanian emigration trends to EU countries also indicate a growing number of young migrants abroad. In 2019, 16 schools in the EU provided formal education in Lithuanian and 168 schools around the world offered non-formal education for learning the Lithuanian language and culture (Gudelis and Klimavičiūtė 2020; Ministry of Education, Science, and Sport 2019).

The increased birth rate and number of schoolchildren of Polish and Lithuanian post-accession emigrants mark a change from institutional to interpersonal integration




Figure 4. Number of polish and Lithuanian migrants granted citizenship in the UK, 2005–2019. Source: Authors' calculations based on UK Home Office (2021)

(Massey 1986). Studies prove that children's school and afterschool activities form a space for building social ties between the parents of migrant and non-migrant children (Sime 2018). Thus, children and nurseries become social anchors of migrant families (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2018) and create a significant reason not to return (Sime 2018).

Spending patterns are another important indicator of the solid character of post-accession diasporas (Massey 1986), with a decrease in the number of financial transfers sent back home. Data from the World Bank (2019) points to significant remittances sent by post-accession migrants. The highest remittance inflow to Poland reached \$10.5 billion in 2008 (about 2.5% of the country's GDP). In Lithuania, the highest was \$2.1 billion in 2014 (4.4% of GDP). In the following years, however, the level of transfers consistently decreased. In 2016, a survey from the National Bank of Poland (Chmielewska, Dobroczyk, and Strzelecki 2018) of Poles living in four main destination EU countries showed a similar trend. According to the study, about one-third of respondents admitted that they transfer money to Poland, though the propensity to send remittances is decreasing along with the increase in settlement migration. As the authors explained, migrants who do not plan to return 'transfer their earnings less frequently, which may be associated with the fact that the center of their life interests or their closest family are already located abroad' (4).

The growing naturalization rate also confirms the settlement process and integration of post-accession migrants in host countries. According to the UK Home Office (2021), the number of Polish migrants (aged over 18) granted UK citizenship rapidly grew from 414 in 2005 to 7,381 in 2018. Similarly, the number of Lithuanians granted UK citizenship has tripled since EU accession. Similar trends can be observed in Norway, where 321 Polish migrants gained Norwegian citizenship in 2017, compared to 97 in 2005. The number of Lithuanian emigrants with Norwegian




Figure 5. Number of polish and Lithuanian migrants granted citizenship in Norway, 2004–2019. Source: Authors' calculations based on Statistics Norway (2020)

citizenship grew eight times, from 22 in 2005 to 179 in 2017 (Statistics Norway 2020) (see Figures 4 and 5).

To conclude, several factors, including family migration, institutional (growth in the number of Polish and Lithuanian school children abroad, increased births to Polish and Lithuanian parents), spending patterns (fewer remittances sent back to Poland and Lithuania over time), and the growing naturalization rates of Polish and Lithuanian emigrants, indicate the change from liquid diasporas to solid diasporas. The presence of these indicators proves our first hypothesis (H1). This shift, consequently, induced changes in policies toward diaspora members.

The transformation of the post-accession diaspora policies of Poland and Lithuania

The evolution of the post-accession diasporas from Poland and Lithuania was not ignored by the origin states. Since 2004, various attitudes and approaches to governing populations abroad have resulted in the evolution of diaspora policies. In our analysis of the Polish and Lithuanian cases, we perceive four primary layers in the formation of post-accession diaspora policies, which aim to support hypothesis two (H2) by indicating states' reactions to the changes in the nature of the diaspora:

- (1) adjustment
- (2) inducement
- (3) partnership (tapping)
- (4) embracement

These policy layers correspond to policy directions that are determined by how the origin states have adapted to changes produced by the external factors of migration

flows and changing diaspora profiles (from liquid to solid). The proposed layers partially match Gamlen's (2006) division of diaspora governance perspectives (tapping, embracing, governing). We adopt the first two, tapping and embracement, as they directly refer to the diaspora, while the third perspective depicts the divergence of policies (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003) adjusting to global governmentality models (Gamlen et al. 2013). The final layer of policy development – embracement – anticipates the state's intentions to preserve and spread national culture and identity.

The first two policy layers, adjustment and inducement, demonstrate how the origin states of Poland and Lithuania adopted their diaspora policies to the massive post-accession emigration. At the adjustment layer, the origin state actively observes the dynamic outflows and takes initial steps in establishing relations with the diaspora members. The uncertain durability and sustainability of emigration mean that the state's attitude is focused on pragmatic assistance, such as legal advice for citizens abroad. The adjustment is covered by the inducement policy layer, which describes the state's reaction to rapid unexpected changes in the international environment related to, first, the worldwide economic crisis, which is relative to the episteme entry point (Ragazzi 2009) that severely hit EU countries' economies (including the destinations of post-accession migrants), and second, anticipated return flows and inducement to stay in the home country. The third direction of the diaspora policy evolution, partnership (tapping), marks the beginning of more mutual/reciprocal relations between the states of origin and diaspora. At this layer, the diaspora is expected to be not only a recipient of support but also a donor (contributing to the development of the country of origin and advocating for foreign policy). The last policy direction, embracement, is a continuation of the partnership one, however, there is an additional dimension in which the state aims to strengthen the identity bonds of diaspora members with the country of origin (Gamlen 2006).

Adjustment: observing the rise of the diaspora

With accession to the EU, Poland and Lithuania faced unexpected dynamic outflows and fast-growing communities in main destination countries. The uncertainty related to the durability and sustainability of emigration posed a challenge for authorities. Diaspora policies focused on pragmatic assistance, such as facilitating access to consular services and organizing information campaigns on the labor and social rights of migrants working abroad.

After the political transformation in 1989, the Polish authorities took limited actions to maintain contact with and govern the diaspora. Nevertheless, their actions were inconsistent and discontinuous (Nowosielski and Nowak 2017). The size and diversity of populations of Poles abroad required a precise definition and direction for diaspora policy (Chałupczak et al. 2014, 314). The diaspora policy toward post-accession emigrants was characterized as a 'reactive' (312) adjustment to the economic and socio-political situation in the EU.

The unprecedented number of Poles who moved abroad in 2004–2005 motivated the Polish government to focus not only on the 'old' Polish diaspora but also on recent emigrants in EU countries (Nowosielski and Nowak 2017). Emigration, however, was perceived as a temporary and solely labor-oriented migration (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008). As a result, in 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland (MFA) created an action plan to increase care for Polish economic migrants called 'Closer to Work, Closer

to Poland.' The primary purpose of the program was to support labor migrants through administrative facilitation ('easier access and more efficient service in Polish consular offices') and provide information on working and living conditions in the destination countries, including information on corresponding institutions. Broadly speaking, the program was the first outline of a post-accession diaspora policy in Poland aimed at providing 'institutional support to "inexperienced" Poles emigrating for work' (Lesińska 2013, 84).

The main document regulating engagement with the Polish diaspora is 'The governmental program of collaboration with the Polonia and Poles living abroad.' Adopted in 2007, it was an extension of the one approved in 2002 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs MFA of Poland 2002; 2007). Alongside the 'old' diaspora (Polonia), the document also mentions post-accession emigrants. The plan calls for establishing contact by monitoring international laws, ensuring support in the target countries, and providing comprehensive cooperation with Poland. The MFA program also points to the necessity to publicly discuss the topic of emigration and elaborates strategies for preventing out-migration and encouraging return migration. This indicates that, three years after accession to the EU, the Polish government started to realize the significance of emigration.

At the same time, Lithuanian authorities perceived emigration as the right of the citizens 'to move and choose their place of residence in Lithuania freely, and to leave their country freely,' as stipulated in Article 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. Among the first steps taken by the state of Lithuania to establish relations with the growing number of post-accession diaspora were plans for 2007 to prepare a draft program to outline relations with Lithuanians living abroad (Government of the Republic of Lithuania 2006).

Inducement: enhancing return migration

The inducement policy layer indicates the actions by which kin-states establish diaspora policies encouraging return migration and preventing emigration in response to unpredictable mass emigration. Return migration of Polish emigrants, however, has mostly been observed in times of worldwide economic crisis. It is estimated that from 2008–2011, 23% to 32% of Polish emigrants returned to Poland, although many did not stay long and undertook other migrations abroad (Anacka and Fihel 2014).

Return migration became a prominent topic in Poland during the 2007–2009 economic crisis. In 2007, The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy of Poland (MFSP) adopted the 'Return' program. The main aim was to create the best return conditions for those who had recently emigrated for economic reasons. This program had several strategies and involved different administrative bodies. The main tasks were to encourage and facilitate the returnees by providing information on the labor market, employment, and self-employment in order to build a positive image of Poland and Polish culture abroad and reinforce national identity among young migrants by ensuring access to Polish education online (Ministry of Labor and Social Policy 2007).

The Polish government and institutions responsible for establishing relations with the diaspora also prepared many initiatives and programs to induce return migration by implementing changes at the national and regional levels. The most significant were: *returntopoland.pl* (2007), 'To return and what next?' (2007), 'Have you got a PPlan to return?' (2008), 'The 12 cities – to go back, but where?' (2009), and 'Become your own

boss – stay in Poland’ (2010) (Fiałkowska and Szczepański 2012). Most of the information on the process of returning to the homeland was published in the guidelines ‘The Returner. Navigation for Returnees’ (*Powrotnik. Nawigacja dla powracających*). These guidelines and the webpage powroty.gov.pl were launched in 2008 as part of the program ‘Have you got a PPlan to return?’ (*Masz PPlan na powrót?*) (Szczepański 2010).

In 2012, the Council of Ministers of Poland adopted the document ‘Migration Policy of Poland – the Current State and Postulated Actions’ (*Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania*), a part of which referred to labor emigration and return migration issues. The main suggestions of this document were to take actions aimed at strengthening the ties of emigrants with Poland, enabling them to participate in the economic, social, cultural, and political life of Poland, and providing them with access to information on the return procedure. The policy implemented at the time in Poland, however, was perceived as a ‘policy on the return’ (*polityka wobec powrotów*) rather than a ‘policy for the return’ (*polityka na rzecz powrotów*) (Chałupczak et al. 2014, 317). Hence, the inducement policy for the Polish post-accession diaspora was rather reactive, with the main aim being ‘not to stimulate returns but to facilitate the process as it happens’ (Lesińska 2013, 87; Council of Ministers of Poland 2012).

In Lithuania, inducement for the stay and return of emigrants has been the central objective of the diaspora policy since the EU accession. This layer of the diaspora policy directions started with the government’s first official efforts to encourage return migration adopted in the ‘Strategy to Regulate Economic Migration’ (*Ekonomines migracijos reguliavimo strategija*) in 2007, which aimed to diminish the emigration flow to ensure a ‘sufficient supply of labor during a time of rapid economic growth’ (Gudelis and Klimavičiūtė 2016, 330). In 2008, the ‘For the long-term relationship with foreign Lithuanians 2008–2020’ program was approved and it defined major directions for future actions. The ruling anticipated the main strategies for preserving national identity, popularizing the Lithuanian culture and language, and creating conditions for those who intend to return to the homeland. In addition, in 2008 the ‘Guidelines of Immigration Policy’ were approved. One of the major aims of this program was to provide support to the returning families with children in terms of education and psychological assistance. The policy also noted the importance of scientific research on emigration and return migration. Moreover, the Guidelines encompassed other fields, including encouraging business initiatives and agriculture, such as by supporting young farmers returning from abroad (Sipavičienė, Gaidys, and Dobrynina 2009).

The next steps in Lithuania’s diaspora policy on return migration were taken by the principal purposes of the ‘Global Lithuania’ (*Globali Lietuva*) multidimensional program (2011). Broader descriptions of the government’s strategies for the post-accession diaspora are included in the program ‘Create for Lithuania’ (*Kurk Lietuvai*), launched in 2012 to foster the return migration of professional youth, and the government-run Migration International Center’s ‘I Choose Lithuania’ (*Renkuosi Lietuvą*) program, established in 2015 to inform Lithuanian migrants on various issues concerning their stays in host countries and provide information on return procedures, including materials on Brexit (I Choose Lithuania Renkuosilietuva.lt).

Further strategies for inducing emigrated compatriots were included in the ‘Return’ Law (*Grįžimo*), adopted in 2017, and the resolution ‘On the Approval of the Strategy for Demography, Migration and Integration Policy for 2018–2030’ (*Dėl Demografijos, migracijos ir integracijos politikos 2018–2030 metų strategijos patvirtinimo*), adopted by the Seimas (the parliament of Lithuania, which constitutes the legislative branch of

government) in 2018. The above resolutions, however, do not provide detailed information on processes for the return of Lithuanian emigrants and, thus, most returnees face financial, social, or psychological challenges during re-integration into the homeland (Zagorskienė 2021).

Partnership: reciprocal cooperation

After 2011, the Polish diaspora policy underwent an essential change in the paradigm from the 'old diaspora policy' to the 'new diaspora policy,' which soon transformed into the 'hybrid' policy (Fiń et al. 2013; Nowak and Nowosielski 2018). Along with changing the key agency responsible for maintaining relations with the diaspora from the Senate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the key strategy was defined as establishing 'a partnership-based collaboration with the diaspora and Poles living abroad leading to the understanding of and effective backing for Poland's national interests and Polish foreign policy and to harnessing the capacities of the diaspora and Poles living abroad for the promotion and building of Poland's positive image worldwide,' which was approved in 2012 in the document 'The Priorities of Poland's foreign policy in 2012–2016' (MFA of Poland 2012). The partnership policy switched from providing care as an obligation toward compatriots to the diaspora's obligations toward the state (Chałupczak et al. 2014). The new strategy was to enhance the diaspora, which could become a tool for accomplishing the Polish government's foreign policy. Consolidation of the diaspora was primarily done through financing projects to realize the country's foreign policy (Nowosielski and Nowak 2017, 146).

In Lithuania, the 2011 'Global Lithuania' program focused on partnerships and described the strategy to engage with the diaspora. To implement the program's different tasks, 13 agencies were mandated. The kin-state perceives the diaspora as a partner and a source of development for the home country. Article 2 of the strategy states that the main aim of the Lithuanian government is to ensure 'mutual partnership and respect-based cooperation between the Lithuanian state and its diaspora, encouraging foreign Lithuanians to nurture the Lithuanian language, Lithuanian national identity, strengthen their mutual relations and political, civic, economic and cultural ties with Lithuania.' Hence, the 'Global Lithuania' program matches the 'tapping' and 'embracing' approaches for engaging with the diaspora (Gamlen et al. 2013). The 'tapping' approach is prioritized, as Lithuanians abroad are viewed as having the 'potential to build the state prosperity' and to 'create state welfare' (Gudelis, Gečienė, and Jakulevičienė 2012). Regarding the members of the diaspora who the Lithuanian government would like to return, better educated Lithuanian compatriots are prioritized over manual laborers.

To enhance partnership policy, the Lithuanian government accepted the 'On the Approval of the Lithuanian Migration Policy Guidelines' (*Dėl Lietuvos Migracijos Politikos Gairių Patvirtinimo*) resolution in 2014. Part IV of the document defines the key steps for maintaining emigration, including (Article 18): 'establishing cooperation with the target countries to attract investments to Lithuania; striving to change the emigration process into the circular migration to bring benefits from the target countries.'

To foster partnership relations with the diaspora, the program 'Global Regions' (*Globalūs regionai*) was launched in 2017. The main purpose of which was to encourage Lithuanian emigrants to become ambassadors for the homeland and home cities/towns and be able to 'provide ideas for their own region, consult, get involved in the

development of the region and contribute to the formation of the Lithuanian community' (Globalūs regionai n.d..).

A valid version of 'On the Approval of the Lithuanian Migration Policy Guidelines' regulation was approved on 29 February 2020 (E-Seimas, On the Approval of the Lithuanian Migration Policy Guidelines). The key changes were to establish a mutual partnership with the diaspora and mobilize 'foreign Lithuanians to strengthen the state and make its name known, encourage them to participate in mutual relations and political, civic, economic, cultural relations with Lithuania,' to 'create technological and organizational opportunities for foreign voters to vote securely electronically,' to organize 'presentations of national heritage products and traditional food at international food and beverage exhibitions, fairs or other events abroad and disseminating information on national food production and consumption traditions,' and to "organize employers' fairs, meetings and implement other job search projects abroad to create opportunities for Lithuanian employers to look for employees among Lithuanians living abroad and encourage Lithuanians to go to work in various regions of Lithuania" (Article 2.2–2.5.). Consequently, both Poland and Lithuania have, to varying degrees, perceived their diasporas as a source for developing their countries and implementing foreign policies during the partnership layer of the diaspora policy.

Embracement: reinforcing/strengthening national identity

The last layer of diaspora policy – embracement – anticipates comprehensive care and cooperation with compatriots living abroad by ensuring the development of national identity and the sharing and strengthening of national language and culture among diaspora members. After 2015, the Polish government implemented several changes in its foreign and diaspora policies. A long-term program called 'Government program of cooperation with Polish diaspora (2015–2020)' aimed to continue the preceding strategy. Among the five strategic goals mentioned in the program, the first two focus on education and identity: supporting the teaching of Polish language and teaching in Polish to the Polish diaspora, especially to children, and maintaining and reinforcing Polish identity by widening access to Polish national culture. The development of educational infrastructure in the national language abroad has become a key area for sustaining contact with young diaspora members and most annual funds dedicated to the diaspora in the state budget are dedicated to this aim.

A similar approach is noticeable in the case of Lithuania. The government's embracement approach has been mostly directed toward promoting Lithuanian education, culture, and language abroad, strengthening the national identity, supporting foreign Lithuanian media, encouraging Lithuanians to foster 'Lithuanianness' and community spirit, and protecting the rights of countrymen abroad. These strategies have been mentioned in various laws and resolutions since 2006, however, the major document describing steps for their realization is 'Global Lithuania.'

To conclude, both states focus a significant proportion of their diaspora policies on maintaining relations with the 'new' diaspora, with the intention of ensuring that counterparts have access to Polish and Lithuanian education, literature, culture, and heritage. Thus, an important aspect of the embracement policy is to reinforce national identity and a sense of belonging to the national community beyond the borders.

Discussion and conclusions

A conceptual framework of the evolution of migration processes and diaspora formation served as our starting point to investigate the development of diaspora policies of post-accession sending countries from ad hoc/reactive toward more deliberate/intentional. This study reveals that diaspora governmentality to a large extent correlates with the trends and changing nature of the diaspora (which proves hypothesis two (H2)).

Using the two cases of Polish and Lithuanian post-accession diasporas, we delineated four layers of diaspora policy: adjustment, inducement, partnership (tapping), and embracement. Note that diaspora policies can exhibit characteristics of all or some of these layers during the policy evolution. Moreover, some layers are likely to overlap and merge within the same period, indicating the multidirectional strategy of the kin-state and the creation of 'hybrid' policies (Nowosielski and Nowak 2017).

At the beginning of the post-accession emigration boom, the Polish and Lithuanian governments each took a reactive position of observing and categorizing the migration outflow. Giving the right to choose a place of settlement, Lithuanian policy moved to the next stage by implementing the inducement policy direction and enhancing return migration. By contrast, the Polish government reacted to the massive outflow in 2005–2007 and introduced the "Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (2007), supplemented by numerous other information programs, rather than active inducement and return plans (Lesińska 2013). For Lithuanian policy, inducement was an extended and significant policy direction. Starting with the global economic crisis in 2008, several global programs for facilitating returning to and staying in Lithuania were launched. This layer is still central in Lithuanian and Polish policies, particularly due to the new circumstances of Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Consequently, the two layers of adjustment and inducement refer to reactive diaspora policies aimed at governing liquid diasporas. State responses to changes in the migration flow of post-accession migrants focus on assisting migrants. These may be described as 'ad-hoc policies;' as the authorities attempt to react to the particular situation and adjust to changing circumstances. Due to prevailing temporary migration and steadily growing permanent migration from both states (Central Statistical Office of Poland 2020), the Polish and Lithuanian governments started to pursue political-economical goals by tapping the 'new' diasporas (Fiń et al. 2013). The authorities recognized that post-accession migrants are in the process of settlement (by observing family emigration and the growing number of children born abroad) and this change entailed a shift in diaspora policy toward building partnerships with citizens abroad. The partnership policy direction of both states anticipated the realization of not only reciprocal interests but, to a larger extent, the states' expectations of the diasporas in building states' welfare (Gudelis, Gečienė, and Jakulevičienė 2012).

Along with the partnership policies, the Polish and Lithuanian states have both carried out an embracement policy layer. In reaction to the changing character of migration from liquid to solid (proving H1), evidenced by the growth in childbirths and naturalization abroad, the states devoted more attention to enhancing national and cultural bonds by building institutional integration (Massey 1986) and supporting the development of educational and cultural institutions overseas.

The tendencies toward a solidifying diaspora and strengthening embracement policies are also marked by the growing interpersonal integration of Poles and Lithuanians. Long-term migrants and settlers go beyond the local communities and

become grounded in new societies, anchored by mixed-marriages and giving birth abroad (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2018). Thus, this study supports earlier findings that children become significant anchors in a new society (Moskal 2011; Sime 2018). Moreover, new family patterns require the reconsideration of spending patterns, as settled life abroad requires spending finances locally rather than sending remittances back. Therefore, this study indicates that the partnership and embracement policy layers are related to the post-accession diaspora becoming more solid. These changes forced origin state authorities to adopt different approaches to diasporas and implement more pro-active policies with long-distance and long-term perspectives to strengthen ties between the state, emigrants, and their descendants.

Our analysis of the evolution of the Polish and Lithuanian diasporas and diaspora policies reveals that, despite similar trends in outflows and evolution toward a more solid diaspora, the Polish and Lithuanian cases vary at some points. Polish emigration statistics indicate a steady growth in the number of both short- and long-term migrants, despite economic improvements in Poland. Lithuanian emigration is characterized by various flows and its dynamics largely depend on international relations and labor market regulations within EU countries (Weinar 2017), which, as a result, led to the prevailing partnership policy directions (Gamlen et al. 2013).

Diaspora governance in Poland and Lithuania largely vary. Polish diaspora policy has notably evolved applying all four policy layers, from adjustment to embracement, through various techniques like inducing, tapping, and embracing. Recent documents defining diaspora policy (2015–2020) anticipate all three techniques and call for the growth of institutions that not only manage and inform diaspora members (like consulates) but also ensure national and cultural identity abroad (such as schools, weekend schools, and NGOs). The Lithuanian government's policy reflects the state's deterritorialization and the increase in the Lithuanian population living abroad. Due to the ephemeral outflows of both short- and long-term migrants, the irregular inflows of remittances, and the growth in the number of births of children abroad, the diaspora policy in Lithuania required changes. It is characterized by an extended period of policy adjustment that involved gaining knowledge of how to govern and categorize the diaspora. Nevertheless, many government programs and policies are directed toward inducing return migration and embracing post-accession diaspora members (see also Gudelis and Klimavičiūtė 2016). The Lithuanian government is characterized by a less dynamic but persistent diaspora policy. An introduction of the main policy program (Global Lithuania) dates to 2011. Despite defining the state's different strategies, such as inducement, partnership, and embracement, this document focuses on descriptive directions and perspectives of engaging with the diaspora rather than practical instruction and support (Zagorskienė 2021).

To conclude, this article demonstrates how the Polish and Lithuanian post-accession diasporas transformed from liquid to solid (H1), which necessitated changes in diaspora governmentality (H2). It presents the four major layers of post-accession diaspora policy formation. This article also contributes to studies on diaspora evolution and the types of diaspora governmentality. Moreover, it points to the importance of broader categories for post-accession diaspora policy formation by enriching existing notions and perspectives (Fiń et al. 2013; Gamlen 2006; Ragazzi 2009; Nowosielski and Nowak 2017) through introducing the two significant layers of adjustment and inducement. The latter became the central policy perspective in both the Polish and Lithuanian cases. This study is based on existing data and research. Therefore, there is a need for further empirical

studies evaluating the importance of adjustment and inducement layers of diaspora policy.

Note

1. Two of the countries (Norway and the UK) were chosen to present data on childbirth and naturalization. The choice was intended to showcase data from a country with a longer (the UK) and shorter (Norway) history of immigration from new EU members countries. Both states are significant destination countries for Polish and Lithuanian migrants.

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